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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
\

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Ji

v.

:

HENRY LEE,

3\

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 920566-CA

Category No. 2

\

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(7)
(Supp. 1992).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as the appeal
is from a district court in a criminal case not involving a
conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly authorize a no-knock

entry for purposes of carrying out the search?
A magistrate's authorization of a no-knock search is
held to be improper only if the warrant affidavit, read as a
•

*

.

whole, fails to support an inference that if the searching
officers first announce their purpose, evidence may be lost, or
physical harm may result to any person.

See State v. Rowe, 806

P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-2310 (1990)), rev'd on other grounds. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah

1992).

Thus deferential review of no-knock authorization is

appropriate.
2.

Was the affidavit complete and sufficient to

establish probable cause?
Appellate courts are "obliged to pay great deference to
[a] finding of probable cause" and does not make a de novo
review.

State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 832 (Utah App. 1991).
3. Was the affidavit sufficient to establish probable

cause under the state constitution?
The question of whether the state constitution requires
less deferential review is a policy question, and hence one of
law.
4.

Did the trial court correctly determine that there

was probable cause to arrest defendant?
A trial court's ruling on probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest is not reversed on appeal "unless it clearly
appears that [the trial court] was in error."

State v. Rocha,

600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (quoting State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972)).

Accord State v. Bartlev, 784

P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1988) ("the trial court committed no
clear error either in its denial of defendant's motion to
suppress or in its finding of probable cause to arrest").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 27, 1991, defendant was charged with
possession of heroin, a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8-(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1992)1 (Record [hereafter R.] at 10-11).

The case was bound

over to the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Frank G. Noel, district judge, presiding (R. at
23).

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming that

it was obtained in violation of both the federal and state
constitutions (R. at 27-30).
A hearing on the motion was conducted on June 15, 1992
and the court issued a minute entry that day, denying the motion
(R. at 43 and 39-41).

As directed, the prosecution prepared

written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the
judge's decision (R. at 57-61).

On June 17, 1992, defendant

entered a guilty plea2 to attempted possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
SS 57-38-8(2)(a)(i) and 57-38-8(7) (R. at 48 and 64). The plea
was conditioned on defendant's right to pursue this appeal of the
suppression denial (R. at 50). Defendant was sentenced and
placed on probation (R. at 64).

Citation is to the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378 which does not vary in any significant way from the statute as it
read at the time defendant was charged.
defendant's signed statement indicates his plea was one of
"no contest.,f

-3-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 24, 1991, a search warrant, with
accompanying affidavit, was presented to and 'signed by a
magistrate of the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County
(Exhibit #1; a copy of the warrant and affidavit is attached as
Addendum A).

The warrant authorized search of the person of

Verra [sic] Mason and an apartment in Salt Lake County and
authorized seizure of cocaine, heroin, drug paraphernalia,
currency, and documents regarding occupancy of the apartment and
drug purchases.

Details of the affidavit will be included in the

argument portion of this brief.
After receiving the signed warrant, Brad Bassi, an
agent of the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, in concert
with other agents and agents of the federal Drug Enforcement
Agency, executed it at the apartment named (R. at 88-90).3

The

agents were wearing jackets which identified them as peace
officers (R. at 102). Pursuant to the no-knock authorization of
the warrant, the officers pushed the outer door open, identified
themselves as police, then entered the living area (R. at 101,
91).

Continuing to identify themselves, they quickly moved

through the apartment, securing each room as they went (R. at
91).

As they entered the hallway leading to the bedrooms, they

ordered anyone in the bedrooms to come out.

At that point, "the

left arm of Mr. Lee started to appear";• he was ordered out of the
3

Citation to the transcript of the,suppression hearing is to
the stamped record pages at the bottom of each page rather than to
the internal pagination of the transcript.
-4-

bedroom and onto the floor (R. at 92, 104-105).

The officers

went in to the bedroom and found another man lying on the floor
next to the bed (R. at 92, 106-107).

In the room were three

needles, "heroin cut in pieces on the plate lying on the bed, a
knife on the plate, various drug paraphernalia, spoons, [and]
packaging material laying on a small table" (R. at 93). At one
point, agent Bassi noticed "fresh [needle] track markings" on
defendant's arm (R. at 107-108).

He also saw symptoms of heroin

ingestion; defendant was "having a tough time staying awake. We
call it nodding off."

(R. at 119-20).

Defendant was arrested

and taken to the jail where syringes were found during a search
of his person (R. at 115).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No-knock authorization for executing the search warrant
was proper because the affidavit established that at least two of
the occupants of the apartment had arrests or convictions for
weapons and controlled substance offenses.

In addition, the

affiant had stated that, based on his experience, the drugs being
used and sold in the apartment were easily disposable.

The

affidavit established both statutory justifications for issuance
of a no-knock authorization.
The two facts that defendant argues were omitted from
the affidavit were not material to tiie -finding of probable cause.
If the facts that one of the confidential informants was on
probation and had a prior drug offense had been added to the
affidavit, the magistrate would still have determined that

-5-

probable cause existed to search.

Those facts would not have

caused the magistrate to believe the affiant was lying when the
affiant swore that the informant had not received any benefit for
providing the information.

Neither would they have caused the

magistrate to disbelieve that the informant had told the affiant
that the informant had purchased drugs at the apartment.
This Court should not adopt the two-pronged "AguilarSpinelli" test under the state constitution in this case because
defendant has presented no compelling reason to depart from the
totality-of-the-circumstances test.

In addition, the trial court

found that this affidavit would meet either the "AcruilarSpinelli" test or the totality test.
Probable cause to arrest defendant was based on his
presence in the room where heroin was being prepared and
injected, the fresh needle marks in his arm, and the outward
signs of his having injected heroin shortly before the officers
arrived.

Since probable cause existed, his arrest and the

subsequent personal search were reasonable and the syringes found
during the search were admissible evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED "NO-KNOCK"
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Defendant contends that th£ magistrate erred in
authorizing conduct of the search on a "no-knock" basis.
the correct standards of review and proof for no-knock
authorization, this argument should be rejected.
-6-

Under

A.

No-Knock Warrant Authorization Should be
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness.

By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play
only "[w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . .."
Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990).A

Utah Code

Its focus is not probable cause, but

only the question of how the search will be conducted.

See State

v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock challenge did
not assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry");
State v. Soisak, 520 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1974) ("In Ker v.
California [374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (1963)], the
court held that where there was justification for the officer's
failure to give notice under the particular circumstances, this
method of entry was not unreasonable under the standards of the
Fourth Amendment").

For a no-knock search, the statute requires

"proof" that if the search is announced, evidence "may" be lost,

A

The full text of the statute reads:
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure,
the officer executing the warrant may use such
force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority and
purpose, there is no response or he is not
admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in ,the warrant that the
The
officer need not giVe ' notice.
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result
to any person if notice were given.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) (emphasis added).

-7-

or that personal physical harm "may" result.

Utah Code Ann. §

77-23-10(2).
Defendant emphasizes the statutory "proof" requirement
in a state constitutional portion of his argument (Brief of
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 18). This Court rejected a
similar argument in State v. Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
(Utah App. Jan. 13, 1993), when it stated:
The criteria for issuance of no-knock
searches found in Utah Code Annotated section
77-23-10(2) is less stringent than that
required for the initial probable cause
determination. . . . Because the affiant is
placed in a position of predicting the
potential for future events, he or she must
necessarily rely on training, experience, and
any information gathered from confidential
informants or other reliable sources.
Id. at 6 n.2.

Officer belief or experience unrelated to the

particular case, by itself, probably should not justify no-knock
authorization.

However, so long as some case-specific evidence

supports it, a magistrate's no-knock search authorization should
be deferentially reviewed, and reversed only if it is clearly
unreasonable.

There are sound policy reasons for this deference.

By definition, a search warrant defeats the privacy
expectation of the subjectfs] of the search.

There is no

question of consent; the search is going to occur even over
resistance.

In their expertise, the searching officers can

anticipate the likelihood and form of such resistance, whether
efforts to conceal the sought-after contraband, physical
resistance to officer entry, or both. In carrying out the
warrant's command to enter a particular place and seize
-8-

particular things, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1990), officer
expertise about how to best follow that command should be
respected.

See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S.

Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978) (question of how to conduct warrantauthorized search "is generally left to the discretion of the
executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement).

The

language of Utah's no-knock search statute properly allows the
magistrate to respect that expertise; reviewing courts, in turn,
should defer to the magistrate's no-knock authorization.
Where probable cause exists, it is reasonable to
believe that the criminal suspects wish to thwart any search.
The element of surprise may be needed to overcome the suspects'
efforts toward that end.

A request for no-knock search

authority, providing that element, should not be overscrutinized,
especially where the nature of the criminal activity—such as
cocaine and heroin dealing—facilitates easy destruction or
secreting of contraband.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33

(Utah App.), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep 14 (Utah
1992) (small amounts of drugs suspected).5

Compare State v.

Pierson, 238 Neb. 872, 472 N.W.2d 898, 903 (1991) (search for
slot machine; no-knock entry not needed).
Finally, a no-knock search will often be advisable for
physical safety reasons.

In general, ".American criminals have a

5

But see State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-67 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), and State v. Valento, 405
N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. App. 1987) (showing of large-scale
operations supported no-knock authorization).

-9-

long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country
many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more wounded."
Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 tJ.S. 1, 23, 88 S.
More specifically, Utah courts have noted

that drug dealers are often armed.

State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d

1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v.
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 670 n.9 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
P.2d

No. 920140 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992).

Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Colo. 1989).

Accord People v.
Further, in Utah,

possession of firearms for "defense of . . . property" is
constitutionally endorsed.

Utah Const. Art. I, § 6.

The

likelihood of violence upon an unconsented home entry, especially
where criminal activity is already suspected, is therefore very
real.
Accordingly, when law officers have obtained a warrant,
and thereby assumed a duty to search a given place, their request
to enter the place on a no-knock basis should be granted if it is
reasonable.

No-knock authority should be refused, or reversed on

review, only if no evidence particular to the case at hand,
gleaned from the warrant affidavit as a whole, supports it.

See

Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-33.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Upheld the Magistrate's
No-Knock Search Authorization.

Under the foregoing standard/ the magistrate's no-knock
authorization should be reaffirmed on appeal.

"When this court

reviews an affidavit authorizing no-knock entry, we do so in a
common sense manner, viewing its contents as a whole."
-10-

State v.

Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (citing Rowe, 806 P.2d at
732).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 allows no-knbck authorization

when there is evidence that the object of the search may be
quickly disposed of or evidence that harm may result to any
person if notice is given.

The affidavit in this case

established both grounds.
The first basis for issuance of no-knock authorization
is the assertion that a confidential informant (CI) "has stated
that when agents from AP & P [Department of Adult Probation and
Parole] conduct home visits at the named premises, persons inside
the named premises flee from a side exit, for fear of being
arrested for possession or use of narcotics."

(Addendum A,

affidavit at p.2).
A further basis for no-knock is that the ingestion and
sale of controlled substance "has been ongoing for several
months." (Addendum A, affidavit at p.3).

The affiant stated that

he knew "from training and experience that the items sought
[drugs and paraphernalia] pursuant to this search warrant are
easily destroyed, hidden or altered."

Further, any delay would

"allow additional quantities of heroin and cocaine to be sold."
(Addendum A, affidavit at p.4).
No-knock authority was also supported as a matter of
safety.

The affiant, Agent Bassi; was '.the supervising parole

officer for Joseph Dowell, an occupant of the apartment to be
searched.

From review of Dowell's file, Agent Bassi knew that

Dowell had an arrest for armed bank robbery, burglary, and at
-11-

least four arrests for distribution of a controlled substance.
(Addendum A, affidavit at p.3). The agent ha4 also been informed
that Vera Mason, another occupant of the apartment, had a prior
arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses.
affidavit at p.4).

(Addendum A,

In State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986),

the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the reasonableness of precautions
when officers "enter hostile environs."
Terry).

Jd. at 293-94 (citing

A home that is to be entered pursuant to a probable

cause finding is presumptively "hostile."

Therefore, even

uncertain evidence that the occupants were armed formed a
sufficient basis to authorize searching officers to take
precautions.
Defendant makes much of the fact that Dowell had been
arrested sometime before the warrant was executed (Br. of App. at
12).

If Dowell's criminal history were the only basis for

authorization of no-knock entry, this argument might have had
merit; however, the method of entry was based on the facts:

1)

that the CI had previously seen people flee when parole officers
arrived for home visits; 2) drugs are easily and quickly disposed
of; and 3) Vera Mason also had a prior arrest for weapons and
drug offenses. Viewing the affidavit as a whole, it "provides a
sufficient basis for issuance of a no-knock warrant on either of
the two statutory grounds."

Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.

Defendant cites a Washington case holding that hearsay
information about weapons forms an insufficient basis for noknock search authority.

State v. Schmidt, 48 Wash.App. 639, 740
-12-

P.2d 351, 355 (1985) ("An informant's statement that the
defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient")., Schmidt overstates
the quantum and reliability of proof that should apply to the
taking of safety precautions when executing a search warrant, and
appears to contradict the Utah view in State v. Banks, 720 P.2d
1380, 1381-83 (Utah 1986) (handcuffing of defendant in residence
to be searched was "extreme" but not unreasonable given concerns
for officers' safety).

Therefore, it should not be considered

persuasive.
Other cases state that evidence of the presence of
firearms reduces the safety justification for no-knock authority.
State v. Piller, 129 Ariz. 93, 628 P.2d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 1981)
("knowledge of the existence of a firearm excuses compliance with
announcement requirements only where the officers reasonably
believe the weapon will be used against them"); People v. Dumas,
109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (1973).

Such cases seem

to proceed upon a premise that law officers, given a choice, will
choose a more dangerous search method over a safer one. This
"self-destructive officer" premise is unsound.
Defendant cites other cases that seem to assert that
persons suspected of drug dealing upon a probable cause finding
retain the same search and seizure protections as do ordinary
citizens.
(1991).

State v. Pierson, 238 Neb. 872, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902

This is untenable.

Citizens wno are not suspected of

crimes cannot be subjected to any unwanted police intrusions.
Their rights cannot be compared to those of people whose "right
-13-

to be let alone" has already been overcome by a judicial probable
cause finding.

See People v. Ouellette, 78 1,11.2d 511, 36

111.Dec. 666, 401 N.E.2d 507, 512 (1979) (Underwood, J.,
dissenting).
The cases cited by defendant also implicitly presume
that appellate judges, who do not conduct searches, are better
able than law officers, who do conduct them, to decide the safer
means of carrying out this activity.
Ouellette is more persuasive:

Again, the dissent in

"Were I the officer obliged to

search the occupied apartment of one possessing, and perhaps
using, drugs, and reasonably believed to have a gun, I think I
would prefer not to be warned of my arrival."

401 N.E.2d at 513

(Underwood, J., dissenting).
Finally, cases from other jurisdictions that strictly
limit no-knock searches run contrary to Utah policy.

In State v.

Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held
that citizens have no right to forcibly resist even an unlawful
police search, and indeed are criminally liable if they do so.
Id. at 572-76.
warrant.

This search was lawful because of the underlying

Consistent with Gardiner, the search cannot then become

unlawful merely because officers anticipated that occupants of
the apartment might unlawfully resist it, and took reasonable
measures to defeat or prevent such resistance.
In sum, though the risks of evidence loss and physical
danger in an announced search were not certain, they were
sufficient to justify precautions.
-14-

In proper deference to the

officers, the magistrate, and the trial court, this Court should
reaffirm the no-knock authorization in this search warrant.
C.

Nominal allusion to state constitutional analysis
is not sufficient to trigger independent analysis.

Defendant alludes to the state constitution and asks
the Court to suppress under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

In a brief conclusory argument, he quotes this

Court's opinion in Rowe for the proposition that Utah Code Ann. §
77-23-106 establishes procedures for protection of substantial
rights; consequently, suppression was an appropriate remedy for
violation of the statute.
was not violated.

First, as argued above, the statute

Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the

Rowe decision on precisely that point.

On certiorari, the

supreme court said:
The erroneous addition of nighttime authority
in the search warrant issued in this case did
not rise to a fundamental violation of Fourth
Amendment rights, but merely constituted a
procedural violation of section 77-23-5.
Such a procedural violation requires
suppression of evidence obtained only where
it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or
a lack of good faith on the part of the
police.
. . . In order to show prejudice, defendant
must establish that absent the nighttime
entry, "the search would not otherwise have
occurred or would not have been so abrasive
if the Rule had been followed."
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Sep. 28, 1992) (footnote
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sfchoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77
(8th Cir. 1988)).

A violation of the no-knock statute is also

6

However, Rowe dealt with Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5, nighttime
execution of a warrant, rather than § 77-23-10, no-knock execution.
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procedural and, under either the federal or state constitution,
suppression would not be an appropriate remedy even if the
statute had been violated.
D.

No good faith exception analysis is appropriate.

Defendant argues that the good faith exception does not
apply in this case; however, this issue was never raised or
addressed in the trial court.

Neither is the State relying on

that exception at this point in the proceedings.
Because the trial court determined that the search
warrant was validly based on an affidavit which established
probable cause, no argument was ever made about the good faith
exception.

On appeal, the State maintains that this

determination should be affirmed; however, if this Court
concludes that the trial court was in error and that the
affidavit did not establish probable cause, the State asks that
this matter be remanded for development of a record upon which an
analysis of good faith may be made.
POINT II
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS VALID BECAUSE NO MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS OR OMISSIONS OCCURRED.
Defendant contends that the affidavit did not establish
probable cause because the agent left out material facts which,
if added, negated a probable cause finding (Br. of App. at 25).
As a general matter:
A magistrate may issue a search warrant if
there is probable cause to believe that the
property to be seized was either unlawfully
acquired or unlawfully possessed. . . .
-16-

Probable cause is to be determined by the
totality of the circumstances. • . .
Under this analysis, the magistrate must
"make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the 'veracity' and basis of knowledge of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." . • .
Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure
that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed.
. . .

In reviewing the magistrate's
determination of the sufficiency of the
affidavit, we are obliged to pay great
deference to the finding of probable cause
and we do not make a de novo review.

In determining the probability that the
evidence is where the affidavit says it is
likely to be found, the magistrate need not
decide whether it is more likely that the
evidence may be elsewhere or whether a more
prudent thief would have chosen a better
location or would have moved it there more
promptly. Rather, the affidavit need only
address the probability
of a specific
location.
State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 832-33 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332
(1983); other citations omitted).

As this Court noted in State

v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d
45 (Utah 1989), both the federal and state constitutions require
that warrants be based on probable cjause.

"Whether an affidavit

for a search warrant meets the probable-cause standard is
determined by the "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis of
[Gates.]."

id. at 1109.
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In reestablishing the "totality of the
circumstances" test, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the former "AguilarSpinelli"
test as "hypertechnical and
divorced from [reality]."
•

• •

To dissect the affidavit, fact by fact, is
exactly the "hypertechnical" review the Gates
test was reestablished to eliminate.
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66 (Utah App.) (quoting and
citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33, 104 S. Ct.
2085, 2087-88 (1984)), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Specifically regarding a claim that pertinent material
was omitted from an affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court, in State
v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930,
107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987), adopted the federal test for evaluating
the validity of a search warrant.
In Franksr v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.
Ct. 2674 (1978)], the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity
of a search warrant if the defendant can
establish the (i) an affiant in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant made a false
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii)
the affidavit is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause after the
misstatement is set aside. [438] U.S. 17172. By an extension of reasoning, the same
test applies when a misstatement occurs
because information is omitted; the affidavit
must be evaluated to determine if it will
support a finding of probable cause when the
omitted information is inserted. . . . [I]f
the omission or misstatement materially
affects the finding of probable cause, any
evidence obtained under the improperly issued
warrant must be suppressed. . . . The
obvious purpose of Franks and its progeny is
to avoid suppressing evidence when the actual
-18-

facts, if known to the magistrate, would have
resulted in a finding of probable cause.
Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
The information defendant claims was omitted from the
affidavit was:

1) that the confidential informant was on

probation; and 2) that the informant had at least one prior
conviction for drug offenses (Br. of App. at 25). Agent Bassi
testified to this information at the suppression hearing (R. at
98-99).

Defendant's argument that this information was material

and that it's addition defeats probable cause is based on certain
assumptions that this Court should not make.

Defendant argues

that this information bears on the reliability of both the
informant and Agent Bassi. Agent Bassi, under oath, affirmed
that he had neither promised nor paid the informant anything and
that the information given by the informant was against the
informant's own penal interest; the informant had purchased drugs
at the apartment.

(Addendum A, affidavit at p.3).

Defendant

argues that if the magistrate had known the informant was on
probation, the magistrate would have "take[n] into consideration
that probation officers have considerable power and control over
probationers[,]" and "would have noticed that the logical
consistency of the[] statements [that the probationer would have
voluntarily told a probation officer that he had broken the law
without first being promised something]' was suspect."

(Br. of

App. at 26). Defendant has presented no evidence that Agent
Bassi lied under oath about no promises to the CI and yet that is
what he asks this Court to assume.
-19-

To argue that the agent must

have lied under oath and the magistrate would have believed the
agent to be lying if the magistrate had known' of the informant's
probationary status is improper and highly offensive.

Unless

defendant can present some evidence that the agent lied under
oath, he ought not ask this Court to assume that the agent did
so.
Rejecting the implication that Agent Bassi lied about
the informant being given and promised nothing for the
information, the fact that the informant was on probation and had
a prior drug-related conviction was not material to the probable
cause finding.

The informant had been inside the residence and

had seen cocaine and heroin being sold; the most recent
observation had been three days before.

The informant was aware

that Vera Mason had been selling drugs out of the residence for
"a long period of time," and Joe Dowell had been helping her for
approximately a month-and-a-half.
pp.2-3).

(Addendum A, affidavit at

The informant had personal and recent knowledge of drug

possession and distribution at the apartment to be searched.
The reliability of the informant was established by the
fact that he had not been paid or promised anything for the
information and his statement that he had purchased drugs at the
residence was against his penal interest.

A statement against

penal interest is presumed to be truthful because people usually
do not lie in order to implicate themselves in criminal activity.
See e.g., Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

-20-

In addition to the information provided by the
confidential informant, the agent had information from another
informant through a second probation officer.
The use of hearsay evidence to establish
probable cause does not necessarily undercut
the validity of a warrant. If the hearsay is
reliable, and there is a substantial basis
for giving it credence, it will support the
issuance of a warrant. . . . In addition,
there is a presumption that law enforcement
officers will convey information to each
other truthfully. . . . Therefore, double
hearsay between police officers is not fatal
on its face to the validity of a warrant.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192 (citations omitted).

Probation officer

Harvey Van Katwyk had relayed to Agent Bassi the information
which came from one of Van Katwyk's probationers.

The

presumption that law enforcement officers will convey information
to each other truthfully applies here. Van Katwyk relayed the
basis of his probationer's knowledge as being first hand and as
recent as within the previous two weeks.

The observation was of

three people using and selling cocaine and heroin at the
residence.

Two of the three named people were also named by

Bassi's confidential informant as persons using and selling drugs
at the apartment.

Van Katwyk established the reliability of his

informant on the bases that the probationer had not received or
been promised anything for the information and the probationer
was concerned about a friend who had been buying and using heroin
at the apartment.

(Addendum A, affidavit at p.2).

Taking the affidavit as a whole, the court's finding of
probable cause is correct.

Defendant's attempt "[t]o dissect the
-21-

affidavit, fact by fact, is exactly the 'hypertechnical' review
the Gates

test was reestablished to eliminate."

Miller. 740 P.2d

at 1366.
POINT III
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS VALID UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.
Defendant asks this Court to adopt a strict "informant
reliability" approach to probable cause and search warrant
issuance under the Utah Constitution (Br. of App. at 34-36).
This approach is called the "two-pronged" "Aauilar-Spinelli"
test, after Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct.
584 (1969).

In essence, the approach requires that when a search

warrant request is supported by informants' statements, the
informants' "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" must be
established for the magistrate.

See Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S.

213, 228 nn.3-4, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2327 nn.3-4 (1983).
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected a
strict "informant reliability" approach, adopting instead a
common sense-based, "totality of the circumstances" approach
under the fourth amendment.

462 U.S. at 235, 103 S Ct. at 2332.

This approach has been embraced by Utah's appellate courts.

See

State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); State v.
Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29r3(F (ytah App. March 11, 1992).
Informant reliability does remain a factor in the "totality"
analysis.

Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1101; Purser. 182 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 29; accord Gates. 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
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However, where informant reliability is unsure, other factors can
compensate, establishing probable cause.

See, State v. Bailev,

675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (police investigation
corroborated informant's tip).
Defendant argues that under Article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, informant reliability should be a sine flua
non for probable cause and search warrant issuance.

However,

Utah courts have expressed no dissatisfaction or difficulty with
the "totality" approach.

Compare State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,

466, 469 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (finding federal
automobile search law "intolerably confusing," and attempting to
"simplify" it under the state constitution). Accordingly, there
is no compelling reason to depart from the Gates totality of the
circumstances test.7
Defendant cites a number of cases that reject the
totality of the circumstances approach, retaining an AquilarSpinelli informant reliability requirement under state
constitutions.

Often, however, that requirement has been

retained in name only, with the courts holding that informant
reliability problems can be overcome, and probable cause
established, through independent police investigation.

See State

v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 144 (1984).

Thus this

7

Indeed, this Court has appliecj the test to search warrants
under Article I, section 14. See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,
1365 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). But see
State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 & n.l (Utah App. 1989), and
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 & n.2 (Utah App. 1988)
(applying the test but noting absence of separate state
constitutional analysis).
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decision actually represents a totality of the circumstances
approach.
Other cases deal with warrants issued solely upon
informant statements, with no independent investigation.

E.g.,

People v. Griminqer, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988)
(but failing to address fruits of earlier consent search as basis
for probable cause); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Alaska
1985); People v. Sherbine, 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d 658
(1984).8

These cases properly demonstrate that where informant

statements are the only basis for probable cause, the informants
must be reliable; this requirement is retained under the totality
of the circumstances test.

See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205 ("even

under [the Gates] standard, compliance with the Aauilar-Spinelli
guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for
probable cause").
In the present case, the trial court determined that
the affidavit was sufficient "even if the two prong 'AguilarSpinelli' test were applied."

(R. at 40, Addendum B; R. at 60,

Addendum C). This conclusion was correct as demonstrated by the
argument in Point II, above.

8

The cases often warn that^ the informant reliability
requirement should not be "applied* hypertechnically," State v.
Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989), or with "unthinking
rigidity," State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30, 35 (1989).
The tendency to so interpret the requirement was a factor in the
federal adoption of the Gates totality of the circumstances
approach. Massachusetts v. Upton. 466 U.S. 727, 732, 104 S. Ct.
2085, 2087 (1984).
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POINT IV
THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT WAS BASED ON PROBABLE
CAUSE.
Defendant's final argument is that his arrest was
unlawful and the syringes found on his person at the jail should
be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 (1963).
The trial court determined that the officers had
probable cause to arrest defendant.

A trial court's ruling on

probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is not reversed on
appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in
error."

State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (quoting

State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972)).
Accord State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1988)
("the trial court committed no clear error either in its denial
of defendant's motion to suppress or in its finding of probable
cause to arrest"). Probable cause to arrest without a warrant has
been defined:
"'The determination should be made on an
objective standard: whether from the facts
known to the officer, and the inferences
which fairly might be drawn therefrom a
reasonable and prudent person in his position
would be justified in believing that the
suspect had committed the offense.'"
State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State
v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 198$);'' in turn quoting State v.
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972)).
In a minute entry, the trial court concluded that there
was probable cause to arrest defendant.
-25-

The court wrote:

The Court is also of the opinion that
since the defendant was found to be in a room
where officers observed syringes, heroine
[sic] on a plate which was, in the *
terminology used by the officer[,] "cut" and
presumably ready for use, a knife on the bed,
spoons and packaging materials[,] that there
was probable cause to arrest the defendant
and the evidence obtained from his person at
a subsequent search at the jail was legally
obtained.
(R. at 40; Addendum B).

The court subsequently signed findings

and conclusions, which stated, in pertinent part:
6. The defendant Lee was found emerging
from a bedroom where there was a plate with
eight "chips" of "black tar heroin" along
with paraphernalia used to "cut" and to
inject heroin, sitting on top of the bed.
. . .

7. Lee was secured by handcuffs, put in
the kitchen where hypodermic "tracks" were
seen on his arms, and other indicia of heroin
intoxication were observed. He was arrested.
Later, at the jail, hypodermic syringes were
found on his person.
• • •

5. There was sufficient probable cause to
arrest Lee with his proximity to the heroin,
his "tracks", [sic] and his outward indicia
of narcotics intoxication.
(R. at 59-61; Addendum C).
These determinations were fully supported by the
evidence.

Defendant had been in the room where the heroin and

paraphernalia were found until the police ordered him out as part
of the protective sweep of the apartment (R. at 92, 103-107).
The parole officer saw fresh needle "tracks" in defendant's arm
at the time of the arrest (R. at 107-108, 119). The officer had
dealt with heroin users and specifically persons intoxicated with
-26-

heroin "many times."

One "obvious effect" of heroin intoxication

is "a sense of not being able to keep their balance, having a
tough time staying awake. We call it nodding off.
very specific to Mr. Lee at that time."

And that was

(R. at 119-20).

In

other words, defendant's arrest was proper because he had been in
the room where the drugs were located, he had marks on his arm
indicating recent injection of heroin, and he displayed the
effects of heroin injection.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /tr

day of February,

1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
HO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the «tate of Utah.
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Agent
Brad Basal, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That
3/21/40,

(X) on the persons off Verra Mason, A female black adultf DOB,

( ) the vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta Street, (240
East) , the premises is on west side of the road, the apartment is on the
southern most half of the four plex, #1, to include all containers, rooms,
attics, and basements found therein•
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described
as:
SEE ATTACHMENT MAM
which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded:
(X) in the day time
( ) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown)
(x) to execute without notice^of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given •)

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR ROCK FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
AND CUT MATERIAL.
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lakef State of Utah, or retain such property in
your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

day of

Pec

,1991.

JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 0 R ~
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That
(X) on the persons of, Vera Mason, A female black adult,
DOB, 3/21/40.
( ) the vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta
Street, (240 East), the premises is on west side of the road, the
apartment is on the southern most half of the four plex, #1, to
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein.
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now certain property of evidence described as:
and that said property or evidence:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance,
possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute.

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR RQCK FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
AND CUT MATERIAL.
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Agent Brad Bassi, is employed by the State of
Utah, Corrections Department, as a Parole Officer, assigned to
Region Three, ISP. Your affiant has been a sworn peace officer in
Utah for over 3 years. Your affiant has been involved in law
enforcement employment for over 17 years in Utah.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses.
Your affiant is investigating an illicit heroin, cocaine, and
usage case, being conducted at the named premises, by the name
persons on this affidavit/warrant.
Your affiant has received
information from a two separate sources of information.
Your
affiant, lhas been- told by both sources of information that the
persons/listed s & using and selling cocaine and heroin at the
listed premises.
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer Harvey Van
Katwyk who told your affiant the following. Van Katwyk had been
told by one of VanKatwyk's probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who
was reportedly a Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell, were
all three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed
premises.
Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that the
observations of the probationer were first hand. Further the most
recent observation was within the last 2 weeks. The probationer
observed Joe Dowell using heroin and cocaine.
Further the
probationer observed Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin
and cocaine from the listed premises.
VanKatwyk believes the information provided by the probationer
is truthful and accurate for the following reasons. The
observations were first hand. The probationer has not promised nor
paid anything for the information.
Further the probationer is
concerned for the welfare of a friend that has been purchasing and
using heroin at the named premises.
Your affiant has interviewed a separate source of information
herein after referred to as CI.
Your affiant was told the
following. CI has been inside the ijamed premises and observed Vera
Mason and Joseph Dowell's are selling cocaine and heroin at the
named premises. Further the CI stated that the CI has observed
Joseph Dowell's using narcotics at the named premises. Further the
CI has stated that when agents from AP & P conduct home visits at
the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from a
side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of
narcotics.
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Your affiant was told by the CI that the most recent
observation of narcotics sales and usage at 'the named premises was
on December 21st, 1991. Further your affiant was told that Vera
Mason and Joseph Dowell were selling " a large quantity of
narcotics" f from the named premises. CI has told your affiant that
this illicit operation is ongoing, that Vera Mason has been selling
narcotics out of the premises for a long period of time, and
further that Joe Dowell has been assisting Vera Mason in the
illicit operation for approximately 1 1/2 months.
Your affiant believes that the information from the CI is
accurate and truthful for the following reasons. Your affiant has
/f,
not promised nor paid the CI anything for the information provided. / ^
Further CI has made statements against CI's own penal interest. . ,*_
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Your affiant is the supervising parole officer for Joseph
^
Dowell. Your affiant has reviewed Dowell's file and Dowell shows tvio^
prior arrest for bank robbery, (armed), burglary, and at least 4 QJ^JP**
prior arrest for distribution of a controlled substance. Dowell is
currently on parole to the State of Utah for distribution of a
controlled substance, heroin and cocaine.
Further your affiant would like to advise the courts that
Dowell has only been out of prison for approximately 2 months.
Your affiant knows from experience and training, as a parole
officer, that parolee's often, return to their criminal habits and
criminal peer groups.
Your affiant has been told by two separate sources that Dowell
is selling and using cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your
affiant has been told that Vera Mason is also using and selling
cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your affiant has been to
the named premises and have observed both individuals at the named
premises. Further your affiant is aware that Vera Mason has a long
history of substance abuse and sales.
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing and there
will be additional amounts of heroin and cocaine at the named
premises. Your affiant has been told that the operation has been
ongoing for several months. Your affiant has been told that the CI
has made purchases of heroin from the named premises within the
last 3 days.
Further your affiant believe^ that the named premises should
be searched for drug paraphernalia and packaging material. Your
affiant believes that these items will be present for the following
reasons. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these
items are needed to ingest cocaine and heroin and to weigh out
additional amounts for resale. Your affiant has been told by two
sources that they have observed Dowell and Mason use narcotics.
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Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this warrant. Your
affiant has reviewed the criminal history of DOWELL and he has a
prior armed robbery. Further your affiant has been told that MASON
has prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses.
Your affiant also knows from training and experience that the
items sought pursuant to this search warrant are easily destroyedf
hidden or altered. Further your affiant fears any delay in the this
service of the search warrant will allow additional quantities of
heroin and cocaine to be sold.
Your affiant considers the information
confidential informant reliable because:

received

from

the

see body of affidavit
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
see body of affidavit

PAGE FIVE
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i

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a SEARCH WARRANT be issued
for the seizure of said items:
(X) in the day time.
( ) at any time during day or night because there is
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good
reasons, to wit:

It is further requested that (if appropriate)the officer
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of
the officers authority or purpose because:
(x) physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given, or
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed off, or secreted.
The danger is believed to exist because:

£u/&
Brad Bassi

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

s *4 dav of i D ^ ^

ISR/ ,

Judge "y-—y. ; J
- O ^ "-In" theJ^y<j£r>jjcourt
In and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

:

Case No. 921900322 FS

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

HENRY LEE,

:

Defendant.

:

Defendant's Motion to Suppress was heard by the Court on
Monday, June 15, 1992.
hearing

closing

After receiving all of the evidence,

arguments and having taken the matter under

advisement the Court now rules as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that under the totality of the
circumstances the magistrate had probable cause to issue the
warrant.

The fact that the affiant obtained a portion of the

information in the affidavit from another probation officer, who
had in turn obtained that information in an interview with one
of his probationers is not fatal to the affidavit.
Nielsen, 727 P2d. 188 (Utah 1986).

See State v.

STATE V. LEE
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PAGE TWO

The Court is further of the opinion that even if the two
prong "Aguilar-Spinelli" test were applied (no longer the law in
federal constitutional cases) that the affidavit would still be
sufficient.

The Court is of the opinion that the source of the

information, that is Officer Van Katwyk's probationer and the
confidential

informant,

were

reliable

and

that

there was a

sufficiently reliable basis for the information obtained from
said informants.
The Court is further of the opinion that there was probable
cause to issue the warrant as a "no-knock" warrant in that the
person who was the object of the warrant, according to the
information received by the affiant, had an ongoing illicit drug
operation at the premises and had prior arrests for weapons
offenses.
The Court is also of the opinion that since the defendant
was found to be in a room where officers observed syringes,
heroine on a plate which was, in the terminology used by the
officer "cut" and presumably ready for use, a knife on the bed,
spoons and packaging materials that there was probable cause to
arrest the defendant and the evidence obtained from his person
at a subsequent search at the jail was legally obtained.
Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
Inasmuch as the hearing on this Motion was held today, June
15, 1992 and the trial in this case is scheduled for Wednesday,

0040
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June 17, 1992 the Court has not attempted a detailed analysis of
the issues or an outlining of the Court's finding of fact.

The

Court therefore instructs Counsel for the State to prepare a
more detailed set of findings of fact and conclusions of law and
to submit them to the Court for review.
DATED this

TO

day of June, 1992.

STATE V. LEE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

j'.J day of June, 1992:

Howard Lemcke
Salt Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Lisa Remal
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

/» (U£xUi~~
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
HOWARD R. LEMCKE, Bar No. 3729
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

JUL 1 5 1992
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 921900322FS

V.

HENRY LEE,
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
BE IT REMEMBERED that on June 15, 1992, this Honorable
Court convened to consider the Motion of the defendant to suppress
items of evidence
represented
Association.

by

against him.

Lisa

Remal

of

The defendant
the

Salt

Lake

was present and
Legal

Defender's

The State was represented by Deputy Salt Lake County

Attorney Howard R. Lemcke.

The State called one witness, Adult

Probation and Parole Agent Brad Bassi.

The defendant called no

witness, but moved one exhibit that was admitted, a copy of an
Affidavit for Search Warrant.

Both sides argued the Motion and the

Court ruled, denying the defendant's motion, making the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
Findings of Fact
1.

On December 24, 1991, agents of Adult Probation and

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 921900322FS
Page two

Parole and the Drug Enforcement Agency, executed a "no-knock", day
time service search warrant at 1442 South Roberta Street in Salt
Lake County, Utah.

The warrant was signed by the Honorable Robin

Reese, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court.
2.

The defendant here, Henry Lee, was not a person

named in the search warrant, but was found along with others in the
Roberta Street residence when the warrant was executed.
3.

The

Affidavit

information

from

VanKatwyk's

Probationer,

informant.

two

of

Probable

individuals,
the

other

one
as

Cause

contained

identified
CI

for

as

Agent

confidential

Each stated they had seen either Vera Mason or Joe

Dowell using and selling narcotics at the listed address at times
proximate to the application for the warrant.

CI stated that his

occurred

himself,

on

December

21, and

narcotics at that residence.

that

he

had,

purchased

Agent VanKatwyk, a category I peace

officer, spoke to the reliability of his probationer, and Bassi,
the

Affiant,

to

the

reliability

of

CI.

Bassi

also

spoke as

Dowell'& probation officer about knowledge of Dowell.
4.
sighted

In support of a prayer of "no-knock" service, Bassi

Dowell's history, which

included Armed Robbery, Mason's

prior history of arrest including weapons and narcotics, and that
the items sought in the warrant are easily destroyed, hidden, or
altered, and have the potential to be put out into the community.

0058
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5.

After having the warrant signed by Judge Reese, and

prior to execution, agents of Adult Probation and Parole were able
to take Dowell into custody at their office.
6.

The defendant Lee was found emerging from a bedroom

where there was a plate with eight "chips" of "black tar heroin"
along

with

paraphernalia

sitting on top of the bed.

used

to

"cut"

and

to

inject

heroin,

Another person, a co-defendant, Kersey,

was in the bedroom.

Vera Mason was also in the residence and was

charged separately.

Another person, not charged, was also in the

premises.
7.

Lee was secured by handcuffs, put in the kitchen

where hypodermic "tracks" were seen on his arms, and other indicia
of heroin intoxication were observed.

He was arrested.

Later, at

the jail, hypodermic syringes were found on his person.
Conclusions of Law
1.

Although defendant argues that the Gates, totality

of circumstances test for probable cause is not met, the Court
concludes

that

first-hand
reliability

the

information

from

two

sources,

basis of knowledge, and articulated
of

each

source,

in

combination

each

reasons
with

the

with a
for the
unique

knowledge of a probation officer, form sufficient probable cause to
support the warrant and not to overturn the initial findings of the
Magistrate.
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2.

Although the defendant argued that the two-pronged

Aouillar-Spinelli test is required by Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah

constitution,

the

Court

finds

that,

even

if

the

Acraillar-Spinelli test were applied, the Affidavit in support of
the Search Warrant is sufficient.

The Court finds that the source

of the information, to-wit: Officer Van Katwyck's probationer and
the confidential informant, were reliable.

The Court further finds

that there was a sufficiently reliable basis for the information
obtained from saicj informants.
3.

Although

Bassi

himself

did

not

interview

VanKatwyk's probationer, VanKatwyk as a Category I peace officer,
could appropriately vouch for that person's reliability.
4.
before they

The

fact that officers took Dowell

executed

the

"no-knock" warrant,

did

into custody
not

create a

requirement to return to the Magistrate to re-work the warrant when
the circumstances of Mason, and unknown others, being present and
unsecured and the disposable or "flushable" nature of the heroin
remained

in

effect

and

formed

a

sufficient

basis

to

issue a

"no-knock" warrant.
5.

There was sufficient probable cause to arrest Lee

with his proximity to the heroin, his "tracks", and his outward
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indicia of narcotics intoxication.
DATED this

1^

'JM

day of J»ne\ r?92.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. NO*EIj?/N9L
T h i r d D i s t r i c t Court gji&q&ff
v

-, -/GO***
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Approved as to Form:

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for the Defendant
HRL/sc/0599
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